Steve Keen's model of Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis (Steve Keen, 1995) displayed qualitative characteristics that matched the real macroeconomic and income-distributional outcomes of the preceding and subsequent fifteen years: a period of economic volatility followed by a period of moderation, leading to a rise of instability once more and a serious economic crisis. This paper extends that model to build a strictly monetary macroeconomic model which can generate the monetary as well as the real phenomena manifested by both "The Great Recession" and "The Great Moderation".
Introduction
The financial and economic crisis that began in 2007 brought to an abrupt end a period of economic tranquility that many macroeconomists had celebrated as "The Great Moderation" (Luca Benati and Paolo Surico, 2009 , Ben S. Bernanke, 2004 , Steven J Davis and James A Kahn, 2008 , Jordi Gali and Luca Gambetti, 2009 ). The trend for recessions to become less frequent and milder abruptly gave way to a sharp decline in output, a doubling of unemployment, and a temporary fall into deflation.
Figure 1:The Great Moderation gives way to the Great Recession
The causes of this economic calamity will be debated for decades, but there should be little debate with the proposition that it was not predicted by any variant of mainstream economic analysis available at the time. It was however a prediction of the non-mainstream "Financial Instability Hypothesis" (FIH) developed by Hyman Minsky. Steve Keen's 1995 model of this hypothesis generated qualitative characteristics that matched the real macroeconomic and income-distributional outcomes of the preceding and subsequent fifteen years: a period of economic volatility followed by a period of moderation, leading to a rise of instability once more and a serious economic crisis; and the wage share of income declining while non-financial business incomes stabilised and financial sector earnings rose (Steve Keen, 1995; 2000, p. 93) . This model is acknowledged as the reason why Keen was one of the handful of economists to anticipate and warn of the approaching economic and financial crisis well before it actually occurred (Steve Keen 2007; Dirk J Bezemer, 2009 Edward Fullbrook, 2010) .
This paper extends that model to build a strictly monetary macroeconomic model of the FIH, which can generate the monetary as well as the real qualitative characteristics of both "The Great Recession" and "The Great Moderation" that preceded it. I begin with an overview of Minsky's 1980 Minsky's 1985 Minsky's 1990 Minsky's 1995 Financial Instability Hypothesis, since many economists are unfamiliar with this nonneoclassical integrated theory of macroeconomics and finance. 1 The language and concepts in Minsky's theory were also developed completely outside the mainstream economic debate of the past 30 years, 2 and will therefore appear very foreign to most macroeconomists today. I hope that readers can look past this unfamiliarity to apply the spirit of Friedman's methodological dictum, that what matters is not the assumptions of a theory, but its capacity to give accurate predictions (Milton Friedman, 1953) .
The Financial Instability Hypothesis-Genesis
Minsky's motivation for developing the Financial Instability Hypothesis was that, since the Great Depression had occurred, a valid economic theory had to be able to generate such an outcome as one of its possible states:
Can "It"-a Great Depression-happen again? And if "It" can happen, why didn't "It" occur in the years since World War II?
These are questions that naturally follow from both the historical record and the comparative success of the past thirty-five years. To answer these questions it is necessary to have an economic theory which makes great depressions one of the possible states in which our type of capitalist economy can find itself. (Hyman P. Minsky, 1982a, p. 5) 
5)
Minsky instead combined insights from Schumpeter, Fisher and Keynes to develop a theory of financially-driven business cycles which can lead to an eventual debt-deflationary crisis.
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Minsky's analysis of a financial cycle begins at a time when the economy is doing well (the rate of economic growth equals or exceeds that needed to reduce unemployment), but firms are conservative in their portfolio management (debt to equity ratios are low and profit to interest cover is high), and this conservatism is shared by banks, who are only willing to fund cash-flow shortfalls or low-risk investments. The cause of this high and universally practised risk aversion is the memory of a not too distant system-wide financial failure, when many investment projects foundered, many firms could not finance their borrowings, and many banks had to write off bad debts. Because of this recent experience, both sides of the borrowing relationship prefer extremely conservative estimates of prospective cash flows: their risk premiums are very high.
However, the combination of a growing economy and conservatively financed investment means that most projects succeed. Two things gradually become evident to managers and bankers:
"Existing debts are easily validated and units that were heavily in debt prospered: it pays to lever." (Hyman P. Minsky, 1982a, p. 6) . As a result, both managers and bankers come to regard the previously accepted risk premium as excessive. Investment projects are evaluated using less 33 This summary of Minsky is reproduced from Steve Keen (1995) with the kind permission of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics.
conservative estimates of prospective cash flows, so that with these rising expectations go rising investment and asset prices. The general decline in risk aversion thus sets off both growth in investment and exponential growth in the price level of assets, which is the foundation both of the boom and its eventual collapse.
More external finance is needed to fund the increased level of investment and the speculative purchase of assets, and these external funds are forthcoming because the banking sector shares the increased optimism of investors (Hyman P. Minsky, 1982b, p. 65) . The accepted debt to equity ratio rises, liquidity decreases, and the growth of credit accelerates.
This marks the beginning of what Minsky calls "the euphoric economy" (Hyman P. Minsky, 1982b, p. 121) , where both lenders and borrowers believe that the future is assured, and therefore that most investments will succeed. Asset prices are revalued upward as previous valuations are perceived to be based on mistakenly conservative grounds. Highly liquid, low-yielding financial instruments are devalued, leading to a rise in the interest rates offered by them as their purveyors fight to retain market share.
Financial institutions now accept liability structures both for themselves and their customers "that, in a more sober expectational climate, they would have rejected" (Hyman P. Minsky, 1982b, pp. 120-125) . The liquidity of firms is simultaneously reduced by the rise in debt to equity ratios, making firms more susceptible to increased interest rates. The general decrease in liquidity and the rise in interest paid on highly liquid instruments triggers a market-based increase in the interest rate, even without any attempt by monetary authorities to control the boom. However the increased cost of credit does little to temper the boom, since anticipated yields from speculative investments normally far exceed prevailing interest rates, leading to a decline in the elasticity of demand for credit with respect to interest rates.
The condition of euphoria also permits the development of an important actor in Minsky's drama, the Ponzi financier (Hyman P. Minsky, 1982b, p. 123; James K. Galbraith, 1955, pp. 4-5) . These capitalists profit by trading assets on a rising market, and incur significant debt in the process. The servicing costs for Ponzi debtors exceed the cash flows of the businesses they own, but the capital appreciation they anticipate far exceeds the interest bill. They therefore play an important role in pushing up the market interest rate, and an equally important role in increasing the fragility of the system to a reversal in the growth of asset values.
Rising interest rates and increasing debt to equity ratios eventually affect the viability of many business activities, reducing the interest rate cover, turning projects which were originally conservatively funded into speculative ones, and making ones which were speculative "Ponzi".
Such businesses will find themselves having to sell assets to finance their debt servicing-and this entry of new sellers into the market for assets pricks the exponential growth of asset prices.
With the price boom checked, Ponzi financiers now find themselves with assets which can no longer be traded at a profit, and levels of debt which cannot be serviced from the cash flows of the businesses they now control. Banks which financed these assets purchases now find that their leading customers can no longer pay their debts-and this realisation leads initially to a further bank-driven increase in interest rates. Liquidity is suddenly much more highly prized, holders of illiquid assets attempt to sell them in return for liquidity. The asset market becomes flooded and the euphoria becomes a panic, the boom becomes a slump.
As the boom collapses, the fundamental problem facing the economy is one of excessive divergence between the debts incurred to purchase assets, and the cash flows generated by them-with those cash flows depending both upon the level of investment and the rate of inflation. The level of investment has collapsed in the aftermath of the boom, leaving only two forces which can bring asset prices and cash flows back into harmony: asset price deflation, or current price inflation. This dilemma is the foundation of Minsky's iconoclastic perception of the role of inflation, and his explanation for the stagflation of the 70s and early 80s.
Minsky argues that if the rate of inflation is high at the time of the crisis, then though the collapse of the boom causes investment to slump and economic growth to falter, rising cash flows rapidly enable the repayment of debt incurred during the boom. The economy can thus emerge from the crisis with diminished growth and high inflation, but few bankruptcies and a sustained decrease in liquidity. Thus though this course involves the twin "bads" of inflation and initially low growth, it is a self-correcting mechanism in that a prolonged slump is avoided.
However the conditions are soon re-established for the cycle to repeat itself, and the avoidance of a true calamity is likely to lead to a secular decrease in liquidity preference.
If the rate of inflation is low at the time of the crisis, then cash flows will remain inadequate relative to the debt structures in place. Firms whose interest bills exceed their cash flows will be forced to undertake extreme measures: they will have to sell assets, attempt to increase their cash flows (at the expense of their competitors) by cutting their margins, or go bankrupt. In contrast to the inflationary course, all three classes of action tend to further depress the current price level, thus at least partially exacerbating the original imbalance. The asset price deflation route is, therefore, not self-correcting but rather self-reinforcing, and is Minsky's explanation of a depression.
The above sketch describes Minsky's perception of an economy in the absence of a government sector. With big government, the picture changes in two ways, because of fiscal deficits and
Reserve Bank interventions. With a developed social security system, the collapse in cash flows which occurs when a boom becomes a panic will be at least partly ameliorated by a rise in government spending-the classic "automatic stabilisers", though this time seen in a more monetary light. The collapse in credit can also be tempered or even reversed by rapid action by the Reserve Bank to increase liquidity.
Modeling Minsky I: the Goodwin model
Minsky's own attempts to devise a mathematical model of his hypothesis were unsuccessful, 4 arguably because the foundation he used-the multiplier-accelerator model-was itself flawed (Steve Keen, 2000, pp. 84-89) . Steve Keen (1995) instead used Goodwin's growth cycle model (Richard Goodwin, 1967) , which generates a trade cycle with growth out of a simple deterministic structural model of the economy. 
Cycles in the Goodwin model are caused not by any imposed nonlinearity, but by the structural nonlinearity that the system states of the wage rate and the level of employment are multiplied by each other. Interactions between changes in the distribution of income (which emanate from changes in workers' relative bargaining power as employment levels rise and fall) and the rate of growth then cause cycles: a high level of investment causes high growth, so that unemployment falls-which leads to rising wages and a falling profit share; falling profit share then reduces investment and economic growth, leading to rising unemployment; this reduces wages and restoring profit share, leading the cycle to repeat. 
Modeling Minsky II: Nonlinear functions and debt
An essential first step in modeling Minsky's insights concerning the role of debt finance was to replace the unrealistic linear functions for investment with a more realistic nonlinear relation, so that when the desire to invest exceeds retained earnings, firms will borrow to finance investment.
Exponential functions for the propensity to invest captured the most fundamental of Keynes's insights about the behavior of agents under uncertainty: that they behave as if: the present is a much more serviceable guide to the future than a candid examination of past experience would show it to have been hitherto (J. M. Keynes, 1937, p. 214) Agents thus extrapolate current conditions into the future, a behavior that Keynes elsewhere describes as "unreasoning and yet in a sense legitimate where no solid basis exists for a reasonable calculation" (J. M. Keynes, 1936, p. 154) . Thus desired investment exceeds profits at high rates of profit, and is less than profits at low rates (while with a nonlinear Phillips curve, wages rise rapidly at high levels of employment and fall slowly at lower levels), because agents extrapolate current conditions into the future. 
This additional dimension converts the model from a conservative to a dissipative dynamical system, in which the model's dynamics display sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Specifically, the model has a stable equilibrium-defined in terms of the employment rate, the profit rate and the debt to output ratio-and will converge to this if the initial conditions are 
Endogenous money
Though debt was modeled in the preceding system, money was not explicitly considered, and therefore price dynamics were absent. To consider these, the model had to be extended to include an explicit monetary sector. The first step here was to develop a model of an established empirical datum, that credit money is created independently of base money.
The pioneering work on this was done by Basil Moore (1979 Moore ( , 1983 Moore ( , 1988 ). Contrary to the standard 'money multiplier' model of credit money creation, where base money is created before credit money, Moore concluded (citing Alan Holmes 1969) , that: "In the real world banks extend credit, creating deposits in the process, and look for the reserves later" (Alan Holmes, 1969, p. 73 This open problem was addressed by Graziani (Augusto Graziani, 2003 , 1989 , 1990 , 1995 calculations… Money in its significant attributes is, above all, a subtle device for linking the present to the future; and we cannot even begin to discuss the effect of changing expectations on current activities except in monetary terms." (J. M. Keynes, 1936, pp. 293-294) Magill and M. Quinzii, 1992 , Randall Wright, 2010 ). Graziani's simple but profound principle was that "A true monetary economy must … be using a token money" rather than a commodity as money, since "an economy using as money a commodity coming out of a regular process of production, cannot be distinguished from a barter economy" (Augusto Graziani, 1989, p. 3) .
From this he derived the proposition that banks, as the creators of these tokens, must be modeled as separate agents from firms and households, and that all transactions are single-commodity, monetary exchanges involving three agents:
any monetary payment must therefore be a triangular transaction, involving at least three agents, the payer, the payee, and the bank.
(Augusto Graziani, 1989, p. 3) A model of a monetary production economy thus must (a) have at the minimum three agents; (b) model demand as the flows of a pure monetary token (which motivate counter-flows of commodities and labor) between bank accounts held by those agents, and (c) allow for the endogenous creation of money by the banking sector.
Steve Keen has developed dynamic disequilibrium models of monetary production that fulfil these conditions (Steve Keen, 2009a Keen, , b, 2008 Keen, , 2010 , using a technique that combines doubleentry book-keeping with systems dynamics. Each column of a "Godley Table" 
Modeling Minsky III: Endogenous Money
There are 5 accounts in the basic model: 11. Recording the repayment of loans (row 11) 12. Recording the endogenous creation of new money (row 13)
One is the crucial step of endogenous money creation in response to the investment desires of firms (in this simple model, all capital expansion is shown as funded by borrowing money from the banking sector):
13. The endogenous creation of new money in response to firms' investment plans (row 12). 
The fundamental dynamic equations of the financial sector are the sums of the entries in this table, as shown in Equation (1.6):
Steve Keen (2010) used constant parameters to demonstrate the innate viability of a monetary production economy-something that was disputed in the literature up to that point (Riccardo Table 2 , the financial dynamics of the system are given by Equation (1.7). 
The investment share of output is a nonlinear function of the rate of profit
This financial system is coupled to the physical production model via prices. Physical measures of capital and output are now specified as being in real terms:
The dynamic disequilibrium price equation is consistent with empirical research into actual price setting behavior (Alan S. Blinder, 1998 , Frederic S. Lee, 1998 and is derived analytically in (Steve Keen, 2010 ) from the equilibrium condition for physical output and the physical demand for commodities. Prices converge to a markup over the monetary cost of production, where the markup factor (1-) is equivalent to the equilibrium workers' share of real output:
The money wage setting relation is fully consistent with Phillips's original paper, in which he specified not one but three factors that determine the rate of change of money wages: the relationship between the rate of change of money wages and level of unemployment , which is "highly non-linear"; the "rate of change of the demand for labour, and so of unemployment"; and "the rate of change of retail prices, operating through cost of living adjustments in wage rates" (A. W. Phillips, 1958, p. 283) . The full wage-setting equation is thus:
where <1 is a weighting factor for the impact of the change in the employment rate on the wage rate.
The rate of inflation is given by Equation (1.9) above. The rate of change of the employment rate  is:
where as before,  is the rate of technical change,  the rate of population growth, and  the depreciation rate. g is the real growth rate, which is determined by the rate of investment and depreciation, which in turn determine the rate of growth of the real capital stock K r :
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The profit rate is now defined in fully monetary terms:
Together with the technical change and population growth equations specified in Equation (1.5), these equations provide a strictly monetary model of Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis.
The qualitative behavior of this model reproduces the features of the last 30 years: a period of strong cycles in real output is followed by a period when the business cycle appears a thing of the past, but then suddenly a crisis breaks out with declining real output. Similarly, declining cycles in unemployment and inflation appear to imply that the system is becoming more stable, when suddenly inflation gives way to deflation and unemployment grows dramatically (see Figure 9 ). The income distribution dynamics of the model also match the empirical record, and maintains the analytic result shown in Steve Keen (2000, p. 93 ) that, though capitalists are the ones who incur debt in this model, the dynamics of the system transfer this cost to workers. The wages share of output declines as debt levels rise, while the profit rate cycles around its equilibrium value before the final collapse (when exponential growth in the debt ratio means that bankers' share of income explodes as income collapses). 
Conclusion
The results of this model are more extreme than our actual economic situation, partly because aspects of Minsky's hypothesis have been omitted for simplicity (such as the proposition that the price level for capital goods is set in a different manner to that for ordinary commodities; Hyman P. Minsky, 1982, p. 79) , partly because aspects of reality have been omitted for the same reason (such as interest rates varying with the rate of inflation), and partly because the impact of government spending has not been considered (it is considered in the simpler non-monetary model in Steve Keen, 2000, pp.100-105) .
However, though much could be done to enhance its realism, in its present form it provides an explanation not only of the Great Recession, but also the Great Moderation that preceded it. The fact that this model is relevant to today's economic predicament vindicates Minsky's stricture from 1982 that, if we are to fully comprehend how market economies really behave, "it is 
